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Abstract
THE EFFECTS OF SWITCHING COSTS OVER THE PRICING
STRATEGIES OF OPERATORS IN MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET
Mustafa Koc¸, Master Of Arts Thesis, 2008
Supervisors: I˙zak Atiyas, Toker Dogˇanogˇlu
Keywords: Mobile telecommunications market, switching costs, price
discrimination, asymmetric networks, call externality, late entry
This thesis analyzes how the pricing decisions of mobile telecom-
munication operators are affected in a market where consumers’ switch-
ing costs exist in favor of the incumbent firm which entered the market
earlier. The market consists of two periods such that an incumbent
firm owns all consumers in the first period and faces a new entry in the
second period. As long as new consumers enter the market in the begin-
ning of the second period, there will be both attached customers who
suffer switching costs if they cancel their contract and subscribe to the
new entrant and also unattached customers with no switching costs. In
addition, the consumers attach value to receiving calls as well as making
calls which will be introduced into their utilities by the concept of call
externality.
In this context, the incumbent firm will exploit switching costs
by increasing off-net prices higher than the new entrant’s so that it
decreases the attractiveness of the new entrant’s network due to the
fact that it lowers the amount of calls that a subscriber of the new
entrant receives. Therefore, the incumbent firm will be able to manipu-
late the market dynamics through its tariffs by seizing the opportunity
of switching costs. Moreover, this thesis shows that the incumbent’s
market share increases with the access charges so that the incumbent
will prefer higher access charges. In terms of welfare analysis, it would
be inferred that switching costs will decrease consumer surplus in both
price-discrimination and non-discriminatory prices cases. Therefore, the
best practice would be imposition of remedies which eliminate or reduce
switching costs in the market.
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Abstract
MOBI˙L TELEKOMU¨NI˙KASYON PAZARINDA GEC¸I˙S¸
MALI˙YETLERI˙NI˙N I˙S¸LETMECI˙LERI˙N FI˙YATLANDIRMA
STRATEJI˙LERI˙ U¨ZERI˙NE ETKI˙LERI˙
Mustafa Koc¸, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2008
Tez Danıs¸manları: I˙zak Atiyas, Toker Dogˇanogˇlu
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Mobil Telekomu¨nikasyon Pazarı, gec¸is¸ maliyet-
leri, fiyat farklılas¸tırması, asimetrik is¸letmeciler, c¸agˇrı dıs¸sallıgˇı, pazara
sonradan giris¸
Bu tez, pazara o¨nceden girmis¸ olan yerles¸ik is¸letmecilerin lehine
tu¨keticilerin gec¸is¸ maliyetlerinin bulundugˇu bir pazarda, mobil teleko
mu¨nikasyon is¸letmecilerinin fiyatlandırma stratejilerinin nasıl etkilendigˇi-
ni incelemektedir. So¨z konusu pazar iki safhadan olus¸maktadır. Birinci
safhada yerles¸ik is¸letmeci pazardaki bu¨tu¨n tu¨keticilere sahip olup ik-
inci safhada pazara yeni giren bir is¸letmeciyle kars¸ılas¸maktadır. I˙kinci
safhanın bas¸ında pazara yeni katılan tu¨keticiler olacagˇından, pazarda
hem is¸letmecilerini degˇis¸tirmeleri halinde gec¸is¸ maliyetlerine maruz kala-
cak bagˇlı mu¨s¸teriler hem de gec¸is¸ maliyetleri olmayan bagˇımsız mu¨s¸teriler
bulunacaktır. Ayrca, mu¨s¸teriler c¸agˇrı yapmanın yanı sıra c¸agˇrı al-
maktan da fayda edinmektedirler ve bu kavram c¸agˇrı dıs¸sallıgˇı olarak
mu¨s¸terilerin fayda fonksiyonlarında yer almaktadır.
Bu kapsamdaki c¸alıs¸malarımızın neticesinde, yerles¸ik is¸letmecinin
pazara sonradan giren is¸letmeciye go¨re daha yu¨ksek s¸ebeke dıs¸ı fiyatlar
belirleyerek gec¸is¸ maliyetlerinin avantajını kullanacagˇı go¨ru¨lmektedir.
Bo¨ylelikle, s¸ebeke dıs¸ı c¸agˇrı sayısı azalacagˇndan yeni is¸letmecinin abone-
leri daha az c¸agˇrı almakta ve bu durum da aboneler ac¸ısından yeni
is¸letmecinin c¸ekiciligˇini azaltmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, yerles¸ik is¸letmeci
gec¸is¸ maliyetlerinin avantajını kullanarak pazar dinamiklerini kontrol
edebilmektir. Ayrıca, bu tez go¨stermektedir ki; yerles¸ik is¸letmecinin
pazar payı arabagˇlantı u¨cretlerinin artmasıyla orantılı olarak artıs¸ go¨ster-
mektedir. Bu yu¨zden yerles¸ik is¸letmecinin yu¨ksek arabagˇlantı u¨cretleri
tercih edecegˇi so¨ylenebilmektedir. Tu¨keticilerin refah seviyeleri u¨zerine
yaplan analizin sonucunda ise hem fiyat farklılas¸tırmasına izin verildigˇi
vi
hem de s¸ebeke ic¸i - s¸ebeke dıs¸ı fiyat farklılıklarına izin verilmedigˇi du-
rumlarda gec¸is¸ maliyetlerinin tu¨ketici refahını du¨s¸u¨rdu¨gˇu¨ go¨ru¨lmektedir.
Bu nedenle, pazardaki gec¸is¸ maliyetlerini ortadan kaldırmaya veya azalt-
maya yo¨nelik du¨zenlemelerin uygulanmasının en iyi yo¨ntem olacagˇı so¨yle-
nebilir.
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Bu tez, c¸alıs¸malarım sırasında sonsuz sevgisiyle her zaman yanımda olan ve bu
zor do¨nemde hayatıma anlam katan Seray Akkor’a, desteklerini bu¨tu¨n egˇitim
hayatım boyunca esirgememis¸ olan annem Gu¨lhanım Koc¸, babam Mehmet Emin
Koc¸ ve kardes¸im Aysun Koc¸’a adanmıs¸tır.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis, on-net and off-net pricing strategies of mobile telecommunication
firms will be analyzed under the existence of one-sided consumers switching costs
in a telecommunications market where firms are able to apply differentiated prices
for on-net and off-net calls. In other words, subscribers of one network, which
represents an incumbent firm, will face uniform switching costs if they would like
to change their old network and subscribe to the new entrant firm in the telecom-
munications market presented in the model. Additionally, this paper includes the
concept of call externality which is defined as extra utility gained by consumers
when they receive calls.
Nowadays, on-net and off-net pricing decisions of telecommunication companies
are highly debated in the telecommunications industry especially in the markets
in which one of the companies retains competitive advantage compared to other
companies as a result of factors such as market share, brand loyalty etc. The
situation becomes much more dramatic in the case of existence of an incumbent firm
which mostly dominates the market due to an early entry. On the other hand, on-
net and off-net pricing strategies have also essential impact over the interconnection
balances of companies due to the fact that the firms are able to affect the incoming
and outgoing call balances between operators.
Furthermore, this paper will also try to reveal that the existence of switching
costs in the telecommunications market affects the firms’ pricing decisions to a
high extent. It will be examined whether the firms would seize the opportunity of
switching costs in order to lock the consumers in to the network and gain extra
profit through prices discriminated with the assistance of switching costs.
In this context, regulators may look for an optimal remedy for the firms’ pricing
structures in order to ensure consumers’ well-being. However, the firms who re-
tain the competitive advantage in terms of switching costs would like to transform
this advantage into monetary profits. On the other hand, firms without switch-
ing cost advantage would require the regulatory bodies to take their competitive
disadvantage into consideration while maintaining effective competition. In this
context, an important regulatory policy that may be used by the regulators would
be to require the mobile operators not to discriminate between the on-net and off-
net calls. Therefore, after showing the impact of switching costs on the pricing
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strategies of firms in a market where price discrimination is allowed, then I will try
to find out the equilibrium pricing strategies of the firms under the obligation of
non-discrimination between on-net and off-net prices which would be imposed by
regulators as an optimal remedy.
Hence, based on the issues mentioned above regarding the mobile telecommu-
nications market in EU and Turkey, I would argue that retail mobile telecommu-
nications markets with consumers’ switching costs could lack effective competition
and consequently require necessary regulations. Nice examples for switching costs
in other kinds of markets from everyday life could be given as learning costs born
when an accustomed brand of automobile is changed or similarly when an accus-
tomed type of keyboard (F or Q basically) is changed, lack of bonus programs and
campaigns of a highly used credit card for frequent users, commitment problems
arising from penalty fees in the case of cancelation of a long-term contract or agree-
ment, compatibility problems when a complementary product is purchased from
another firm different than the current one.
Switching costs will arise in the case that a buyer purchases a particular product
during a period of time and would like to switch to another substitute product in
the future and finds it costly to switch from the accustomed product to the new one.
Therefore, the market in which the effects of switching costs will be analyzed should
contain consumers making decisions in different periods. In my model, the market
will be constructed as a two-period market in which one of the firms will represent
the incumbent which holds all consumers in the first period and the other firm will
represent the new entrant which makes an entry to the mobile telecommunications
market in the second period. However, only the choice of firms in the second period
will be taken into consideration with the assumption that the incumbent firm in
the first period owns the all subscribers in the market. In this setup, consumers
of the incumbent firm will bear switching costs in the second period if they would
like to change their network and subscribe to the new entrant. Moreover, there will
be new consumers entering into the market in the second period who do not have
any binding situation to the incumbent and will not have any switching costs as a
result. On the other hand, there will be leaving subscribers with the same amount
of entering consumers in the second period so that the total number of consumers
is kept constant. The existence of both type of consumers with switching costs and
without switching costs makes the situation more dramatic and decision process
more complex.
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Furthermore, network effect is one of the most important factor amplifying the
power of a firm in price discrimination. Briefly, network effects are said to exist if a
consumer gains extra utility as more people adopt the same good. Thus, network
effect in mobile telecommunications would correspond simply to gaining utility from
size of subscriber base of the mobile telecommunication firm that one subscribes
to. Moreover, network effect becomes very important in price discrimination such
that the operators would create price-mediated network externalities. The concept
of tariff-mediated network externality is mentioned by Laffont, Rey, and Tirole
(1998b) such that a network may discriminate against its rivals. This situation
creates an opportunity of shaping the traffic balance between the rivals’ network
and the own network. Therefore, I argue that the decision of operators regarding
price-discriminate or the level of discrimination would depend on the network size
of the operators.
Another factor that would influence the decision of operators in price discrimi-
nation is the call externality which means that consumers will obtain utility from
receiving calls. Since the pricing decisions of operators affect the incentives of
consumers in making calls and consequently the level of off-net calls make a contri-
bution to the utility levels of rival operators’ consumers, then price discrimination
decisions of operators are affected by the existence of call externality. Obviously,
call externality is highly related to the size of networks due to the fact that large
number of subscribers making more on-net calls would provide a competitive ad-
vantage for the operator with larger network. Thus, call externality is assumed to
be correlated to the tariff-mediated network externality in short notice. As a result,
my model will also include the concept of utility from receiving calls which takes a
role in operators’ price discrimination decisions.
Briefly, my model includes the concepts of switching costs and call externality
in a mobile telecommunication market where firms are able to make price discrimi-
nation between on-net and off-net calls. The market is composed of two periods so
that there will be both new consumers entering to the market and old ones exiting
the market.
In this setting, one of the outcomes of my model is that the incumbent mobile
operator has incentive to set higher off-net prices in order to attain its subscribers
due to the switching costs. Moreover, it would be inferred that the incumbent
operator’s incentive to set higher access charges increases as the switching costs
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increase. Results of price non-discrimination, which has been suggested as a reg-
ulatory remedy, indicates that the incumbent will prefer setting lower per-minute
prices and then it takes the consumer surplus created by lower per-minute prices
through higher fixed fee. However, this remedy would create traffic and payment
surplus for the new entrant in terms of interconnection. In terms of welfare anal-
ysis, it turns out that it is difficult to reach general conclusions. However, it can
be shown that, by eliminating some of the core market characteristics dealt in this
paper such as call externality and asymmetry between the operators resulting from
the switching costs, the price discrimination would be welfare-improving for the
consumers.
This paper has been organized as follows. A comparative look into the European
and Turkish mobile markets is provided in Section 2. Then, Section 3 provides a
literature review on the concepts included in this paper. Section 4 presents the
model. Section 5 discusses the results and provides findings. The case of non-
discrimination is discussed in Section 6. Welfare effects of price discrimination and
non-discrimination are analyzed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes with
recommendations for regulatory policy.
2 The European and Turkish Mobile Markets in
Comparison
Even though the retail mobile telecommunication markets are in keen interest by
regulators, competition authorities, operators, consultants and academicians, those
retail markets are not regulated in the member states of the European Union be-
cause of the belief that effective competition has been settled in European Union
retail mobile telecommunication markets. The factors contributing to the compet-
itiveness of the European Union mobile telecommunication markets could be listed
as the implementation of number portability, less time between entry dates of suc-
cessive operators in the case of sequential entry, necessary remedies from the early
dates of the markets regarding the interconnection rates (or most widely-known
as access charges), fair policies for the spectrum allocation. All of these factors
have been main drivers of effective competition by eliminating endogenous differ-
ences between operators and enabling operators to compete on offers and quality.
Furthermore, these factors performed significant roles in the elimination of switch-
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ing costs by removing the grounds of consumer lock-in. Obviously, retail mobile
telecommunication markets with longer incumbency periods, which provide higher
degree of first-mover advantage to the incumbent firm, will have more consumers’
switching costs as a result. With the purpose of analyzing the effects of factors
contributing to the existence of switching costs, it will be beneficial to investigate
European Mobile Telecommunications Markets and Turkish Mobile Telecommuni-
cations Markets in more detail. Thus, the following two sub-chapters will help
understand the reasons of switching costs and lack of effective competition.
2.1 European Union Mobile Telecommunications Markets
Mobile telecommunications services in the European Union were initiated in 1980s
with the introduction of first generation (1G) analogue mobile systems. However,
the problems such as incompatibility, low quality and security, capacity constraints
existed during the era of first mobile systems. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
second generation (2G) digital mobile technologies were invented and common stan-
dards named GSM-900 and DCS-1800 have been developed by European Union
countries. In this context, licenses for 2G mobile telecommunications services were
granted to several operators in each country in order to encourage competition and
move away from monopolies. With reference to the penetration rates in EU coun-
tries in the early years of introduction of 2G mobile telecommunications services,
it would be argued that the implementation was quite successful.
Due to the enhancement of European economic integration, European commis-
sion required the development of a competitive pan-European liberalized telecom-
munications sector. In this context, the Commission called for a common regula-
tory framework for telecommunications services in 1994. The body of regulations
that have progressively emerged during the 1990s is often referred as the ”1998
Regulatory Framework”. With reference to 1998 Regulatory Framework, the Euro-
pean Commission has been responsible for developing a common regulatory frame-
work and monitoring the implementation of the common framework in the member
states. Therefore, all member states have been obliged to establish national reg-
ulatory authorities (NRAs) which would be responsible for the implementation of
EU regulations within the member states. More precisely, NRAs are responsible
for the establishment of a competitive telecommunications market while protect-
ing consumers’ rights and encouraging the innovation in the industry. The most
important development in 1998 regulatory framework concerning the regulatory
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tools was the designation of operators as having significant market power (SMP).
Accordingly, SMP operators would be obliged to charge non-discriminatory, trans-
parent and cost-oriented prices in the market where they are designated as having
SMP. In addition, those operators are obliged to provide access for other operators
which would like to end calls in their networks and prepare cost accounting reports
for the sake of transparency. As a result of those regulatory measures, a more
competitive market structure was achieved which resulted in lower prices, high va-
riety and quality of mobile services according to Grzybowski(2005) which provides
a seminal work on the effects of EC regulations over the competitiveness of the mo-
bile telecommunications markets. In those years, independent of 1998 framework,
the mobile number portability regulations were imposed by member states which
would be argued to decrease the switching costs and consequently contributed to
the emergence of lower prices. Concerning the further harmonization of the regula-
tory measures in member states, the European Commission renewed the regulatory
framework in 2002 by publishing new directives. In this context, the new 2002
Framework Directive constituted the backbone for the other regulatory directives
and the Commission’s recommendations. First of all, after significant supervision,
the Commission determined the markets which are susceptible to ex-ante regula-
tion due to the fact that effective competition has not been established in those
markets yet and the Commission published Relevant Markets Recommendation,
in which 18 markets are determined in either wholesale and retail level for both
fixed and mobile sectors. Within the relevant markets, two of them are related
to mobile markets: Market 15 is Mobile Access and Call Origination Market and
Market 16 is Mobile Call Termination Market. The relevant markets are defined as
the markets which lacks effective competition and requires regulatory supervision
so that NRAs should determine the SMP operators in those markets at national
level and impose necessary obligations compliant with the Commission’s directives.
In this context, operators determined as having SMP in the relevant markets are
obliged to provide non-discriminatory access and cost-oriented call termination or
origination prices within the Interconnection and Access Directive. Additionally,
the Commission published Universal Service and Users’ Rights Directive which en-
sures the consumers’ benefits such as receiving equal access conditions to mobile
services and opportunity to change their operators while retaining their numbers.
Thus, the Commission introduced the obligation that NRAs should make Num-
ber Portability available for all subscribers within new framework in 2002. On the
other hand, no retail market has been determined as a relevant market so that
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retail markets are not subject to regulatory supervision due to the fact that retail
mobile telecommunications markets are competitive enough in Europe. However,
significant competition infringements are expected to be solved through ex-post
regulations which require taking necessary actions compliant to competition law
after a competition infringement is observed.
In relation to the competitiveness of the mobile markets in the EU, I will pro-
vide the studies that examine the factors contributing to the competitiveness of
the mobile markets. One of the most important factors strengthening the compet-
itiveness of the mobile markets would be the implementation of Mobile Number
Portability. Since the main focus of this paper is the effects of switching costs over
the pricing strategies of the operators, then the effects of number portability over
prices would constitute a representative figure for my study. Grzybowski (2008)
examines the effects of regulatory measures over price levels where those measures
are fixed-line telephony liberalization and the implementation of number portabil-
ity by also taking the startup time of GSM services into consideration. He states
that price levels depend on the market concentration and the number of competi-
tors which vary between countries due to the differences in the implementation of
regulations. In his paper, he uses a structural model for supply and demand to
estimate country-specific price elasticities and conjectural variations which include
number of operators, GDP levels, bond returns, labor and electricity costs. As a
result of the model he finds out that the regulatory variables decrease conjectural
variations. This result indicates the negative impact of number portability on price
levels. Regarding that the EC and industry regulators often interpret cross-country
price variation as differences in competitiveness, Grzybowski (2008) concludes that
the competitiveness of the mobile industry varies over time due to the differences in
the implementation of regulation by pointing out that the liberalization of fixed-line
telephony market and the introduction of mobile number portability have significant
negative impact on conjectural variations that lead to lower prices. Furthermore,
Grzybowski (2005) measures the impact of regulatory variables on price levels and
demand for mobile services where the regulatory variables could be listed as the in-
troduction of number portability, regulation of interconnection charges and presence
of airtime resellers (such as MVNOs). He constructs an econometric model which
also includes inverse of the number of mobile operators as explanatory variable and
time trend variable in order to take rapid technological change into consideration.
Grzybowski (2005) finds out that competition is fiercer and prices are lower in coun-
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tries that already enforce the portability of mobile numbers and MNP also raises
consumer surplus. He concludes that the implementation of number portability
in the mobile telephony has a negative impact on prices and on the other hand
regulation of interconnection charges through the designation of mobile operators
with SMP increases the demand for mobile telephony possibly because regulation
decreases prices and costs however any significant direct impact of this regulatory
variable on prices has not been found.
In conclusion, it would be argued that the retail mobile telecommunications
market is not regulated through regulations of the EC due to the fact that effective
competition has been established in retail markets through the implementation of
mobile number portability and effective control on interconnection charges through
SMP designations. These regulatory measures are proved to have negative impact
on prices and increasing effect on consumer surplus through establishment of effec-
tive competition. Therefore, the European retail mobile telecommunications may
not require regulatory supervision unless there are significant competition infringe-
ments.
2.2 The Turkish Mobile Telecommunications Market
In Turkey, Mobile Telecommunications Services started being provided in 1994 by
two mobile network operators, Turkcell and Telsim, through revenue sharing agree-
ments with Turk Telekom. Then, Turkish Mobile Telecommunications industry
faced a duopoly period until the entry of Aria and Aycell in 2000. However, after
the long incumbency period and due to the lack of effective regulatory policies such
as national roaming which was promised to TIM, new entrants were not able to
compete effectively with well-established incumbents. As a result of lack of effective
competition in the market, Aria and Aycell decided to merge in 2004 in order to
survive and compete with the incumbent operators in a more effective way.
First of all, regarding concentration indexes compared to those of EU-15 member
states, it would be argued that effective competition in Turkish retail mobile market
has not been established yet, by 2008. The reasons behind the poor performance
of Turkish market would be mainly specified as structural problems related to the
regulatory policies in the early years of the market. Seminal work in the literature,
which examines the historical development of Turkish Mobile Telecommunications
Market and the effects of regulatory policies in this market, is Atiyas and Dogˇan
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(2007). In that paper, they argued that longer incumbency period often implies
larger asymmetries between the incumbents and the late entrants in terms of (i)
geographical coverage and (ii) subscriber base and both asymmetries feed the first-
mover advantage of the incumbents. Briefly, their arguments centered around the
idea that first-mover advantages are amplified by the existence of tariff mediated
network externalities and switching costs and the degree of first-mover advantage
increases with the length of the incumbency period. In this context, it would
be beneficial to summarize the arguments stated by Atiyas and Dogˇan in order
to examine the situation in Turkish Mobile Telecommunications Market since the
structural problems mentioned in that paper constitutes the main motivation of my
paper. Furthermore, it would be appropriate to state that the conjecture discussed
in Atiyas and Dogˇan (2007) will be confirmed in this paper.
According to Atiyas and Dogˇan (2007), the Turkish mobile industry is one of
the most concentrated markets in Europe; the penetration rate positioned as the
second lowest among the OECD countries and the price comparisons for the mo-
bile market indicate that Turkey had one of the highest mobile telecommunication
prices among the OECD countries in 2004. In particular, the paper emphasizes
the negative impact on competition of delaying new entry until after 7 years of
incumbency. It would be beneficial to provide a historical background of Turkish
Mobile Telecommunications Market which has been initiated through GSM licenses
awarded to Turkcell and Telsim in 1994. At the beginning, those licenses were rev-
enue sharing agreements with Turk Telekom until 1998 which is the start year of the
concession agreements for both operators that have been signed in exchange for 500
million $. As a result of this change there has been a significant increase in customer
base after 1998. Throughout the early years of the market, Turkcell gained a sig-
nificant first-mover advantage over Telsim due to the fact that Turkcell entered the
market a few months before Telsim and more importantly Telsim’s activities were
suspended for eight months by reason of violation of revenue agreement. Therefore,
Turkcell dominated the market in the early years of the market both in terms of
revenue and market share such that Turkcell’s market share reached up to 80 % in
those years (Please refer to Table 2 in Atiyas and Dogˇan (2007) for the evolution
of market shares in Turkish Mobile Market.)
In 2000, the Government decided to award three additional GSM licenses. One
of those licenses were to be awarded to Turk Telekom and two separate tenders
were planned for the the remaining two licenses. However, Turkish GSM auction
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design took a place for itself in the economics literature as a bad auction according
to Binmore and Klemperer (2001). The GSM license award process was designed
as follows: the winning bid of the first tender was going to be the minimum bid
for the second tender and Turk Telekom had to pay the same price for the third
license. Nonetheless, there had been no participant for the second tender since the
first tender had been won by I˙s¸-TIM with a bid of 2.5 billion $ which was deemed
to be very high. This situation caused the license fees of the new entrants - Aria
(the brand of I˙s¸-TIM) and Aycell (the mobile subsidiary of Turk Telekom) - to be
five times as high as those of the incumbents. As a result of the new entries, Atiyas
and Dogˇan (2007) states that penetration rates in Turkish mobile market increased
significantly following the entry as well as substantial decrease in per-subscriber
revenues from 216 $ to 114 $ could be attributed to the entry.
In order to facilitate the entry, the Government allowed I˙s¸-TIM to sign national
roaming agreements with other operators. However, both of the incumbent opera-
tors either did not provide national roaming or offered unacceptable conditions for
the new entrants so that Aycell and Aria were not able to effectively compete in
geographical coverage. As a result, Aria and Aycell decided to merge in 2004 and
constituted the brand ”Avea”.
With the purpose of providing the reasons behind the structural problems in
Turkish mobile market, I am going to summarize the arguments stated in Atiyas
and Dogˇan (2007) and analyze the effects of those structural problems over com-
petition. First, the concentration index computed as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)would provide an idea about the competition level of Turkish mobile market.
By the end of pre-merger period, Turkey had the second highest market concentra-
tion index, 0.51, among the OECD countries that had 4 MNOs and a higher index
than other all other OECD countries that had 3 operators stated by Atiyas and
Dogˇan (2007). In addition, I also conducted similar analysis using the current mar-
ket shares of mobile operators in EU-15 countries so that Turkey had the second
highest concentration index among those countries (Please refer to appendix for
comparative concentration index table). Even though the entry had driven up the
mobile penetration, Turkey stood as the second lowest among all OECD countries
with respect to mobile penetration rates by the end of pre-merger period. Similarly,
the same analysis has been performed for EU - 15 countries and Turkey with the
current values and it has been showed that Turkey has the lowest penetration rate
compared to EU - 15 countries. It would be beneficial to analyze factors that affect
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consumers subscription choice, which in turn affects the degree of competition, as
mentioned in Atiyas and Dogˇan (2007) . Since those factors are also structural
problems in Turkish mobile market, a suitable background for the motivation of
this thesis will be provided. Briefly, those structural problems observed in Turkish
mobile market could be listed as lack of national roaming which created slower net-
work roll-out and geographical coverage disadvantages for the new entrants, lack
of regulations in the early years of the entry regarding interconnection rates that
resulted payment imbalance in terms of interconnection payments, high switching
costs of subscribers due to long incumbency period, lack of number portability
regulation, price-discriminated tariffs offered by the dominant firm which caused
traffic imbalances through network externalities.
In the early years of the entry, geographical coverage was one of the most im-
portant first-mover advantages for the incumbents. The setting of a market with
sequential entry is described by Atiyas and Dogˇan (2007) such as: incumbents
have already built their network and reputation, locked-in some customers, and
face smaller new entrants for competition. They further argue that incumbents are
likely to deny roaming if new entrants find it difficult to reach the critical subscriber
base in the absence of roaming. In line with these arguments, the same situation
was realized in Turkish mobile market. In Turkey, the new entrants license con-
ditions required them to make necessary investments in order to reach a coverage
ratio of 50% in 3 years and 90% in 5 years except the coverage gained by national
roaming. Therefore, the national roaming right granted to new entrants would be
considered as a temporary remedy to facilitate entry. Since concession agreements
of the incumbents did not include any roaming obligations, the incumbents did not
provide national roaming for the new entrants. Therefore, with their low coverage,
Aria and Aycell had to compete against the incumbents which almost reached full
coverage due to a long incumbency period.
In case that operators are allowed to discriminate prices between on-net and
off-net calls, operators tend to set higher off-net prices than on-net prices in order
to create a network externality effect which creates incentive for customers to join
the same network with their close friends or relatives. In Turkish mobile market,
the effect of network externality has arisen as a result of both interconnection rates
and retail tariffs. In this context, entry in Turkish mobile market constitutes a
good example for the literature of entry deterrence such that the incumbents both
increased interconnection rates significantly whenever entry occurred and launched
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new tariffs which included significantly discriminated on-net and off-net prices.
Therefore, I will provide the historical evolution of interconnection rates in Turkish
mobile market to point out the effects of interconnection regime over the compet-
itiveness of market. In 1998, after the operators granted GSM licenses, they also
signed interconnection agreements with each other and Trk Telekom so that mobile
termination rates were set as 1.4 $-cents/min symmetrically. The incumbents mo-
bile operators continued to charge interconnection rates at this level until March
2001 when the first new entrant Aria entered the market. Regarding the retail
prices in those years, I would argue that operators gained excessive profits through
very high retail tariffs compared to too low interconnection charges in the period
of duopoly away from the effective competition. In the absence of any regulation
regarding interconnection rates, just before the entry of Aria in March 2001, Telsim
and Turkcell signed a new interconnection agreement with each other by sharply in-
creasing the interconnection rates to 20 $-cents/min symmetrically. In those years,
Telecommunications Authority had been established recently within 2000 and had
not published any regulation on access and interconnection so that interconnection
rates were set by commercial negotiations between operators. On the other hand,
Peitz (2005) proved that asymmetries in favor of late entrants would increase the
consumer surplus. Thus, in terms of consumer welfare,it would have been beneficial
if TA had intervened the negotiation process and set asymmetric rates between op-
erators regarding their differences in cost elements and competitive power in those
years. Following the entry, Aria and Aycell signed interconnection agreements with
other operators at symmetric level of 20 $-cents/min as interconnection rate. This
significant increase in the interconnection charges would be regarded as a tool for
entry deterrence such that Calzada and Valletti (2005) suggest that the incumbents
would prefer to deter entry by setting interconnection charges above costs. In May
2003, Telecommunications Authority published Ordinance on Access and Intercon-
nection while imposing asymmetry between operators in favor the late entrants,
Aria and Aycell. Following Ordinance on Access and Interconnection, Telecommu-
nications Authority started publishing standard reference interconnection rates for
each telecommunication operators. This regulation has also been complemented
with the obligation of operators to submit their reference interconnection offers
(RIO) so that Telecommunications Authority would utilize these offers for determi-
nation of standard reference interconnection rates. As a result of these regulations,
Telecommunications Authority has been able to determine interconnection rates of
telecommunication operators in case of any dispute between the operators. In this
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context, Telecommunications Authority has determined asymmetric interconnec-
tion rates in favor late entrants, Aria and Aycell - later merged to constitute Avea.
However, throughout the years without any regulation regarding interconnection
rates, the symmetric interconnection rates caused payment imbalances between the
mobile operators in favor of the incumbents as a result of traffic imbalances cre-
ated by new discounted tariffs of the dominant operator with significant on-net /
off-net price discrimination. Therefore, it would be useful to mention the issue of
retail price discrimination of the incumbents since price discrimination affected the
revenues in the market to a high extent in the early years of new entries.
Turkish mobile market also contains a suitable example of tariff-mediated net-
work externality. Following the new interconnection rate agreements and just before
Aria’s entry, Turkcell introduced its tariff packages with price discrimination. With
this tariff, the price of on-net calls was reduced to 11 euro-cents/min from 22 euro-
cents/min and the price of off-net calls was increased to 33 euro-cents/min from
29 euro-cents/min. The most significant result of significant price discrimination of
Turkcell was the traffic imbalance between operators such that the large subscriber
base of Turkcell preferred to make large number of on-net calls due to the high
difference between on-net and off-net prices. The only suitable response to Turkcell
tariffs was to introduce tariffs in which off-net calls are charged even below on-net
prices of Turkcell and also below interconnection rates. This strategy was followed
by Aria for only for a few months since Aria had to bear losses for off-net calls. In
addition, this strategy caused large traffic from Aria subscribers to Turkcell sub-
scribers due to very low off-net prices and very low traffic from Turkcell subscribers
due to the significant price discrimination.
Number portability would be regarded as the other regulation that can con-
tribute to the establishment of effective competition in Turkish mobile market. Con-
cerning the long incumbency period in Turkish mobile telecommunications market,
it would be argued that Turkish consumers are heavily dependent on their mobile
numbers so that they are so much reluctant in switching their operators. The lack
of mobile number portability regulation (later the implementation) was one of the
most important reasons of switching costs in Turkish mobile market. Even though
Telecommunications Authority had included the number portability regulation into
its work plan for 2004, the regulation has only been published in February 2007
and the implementation studies were established within 2008. In conclusion, under
the situation of late entry and lack of necessary regulations in the early years of
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the entry such as national roaming, retail price control and interconnection rates
regulation, mobile number portability would have been a good instrument in the
establishment of effective competition in Turkish mobile market.
Regarding the effects of price discrimination on the competitiveness of the mar-
ket, it is known that Avea, Vodafone, Borusan Telekom and SabancıTelekom placed
their complaints to Telecommunications Authority stating that the on-net prices of
the incumbent operator is lower than interconnection rates and there has been high
on-net/off-net differentials in the tariffs of Turkcell. With reference to the com-
plaints of these operators, Telecommunications Authority published a notification
in September 2007 concerning on-net and off-net tariffs of mobile operators. The
relevant articles of the notification would be summarized as follows:
• The on-net tariffs of Turkcell should not be lower than the lowest intercon-
nection rate that Turkcell applies to other operators.
• Regarding the prices of GSM - GSM calls in general subscription packages
for all operators, the upper limit has been determined as 0,66 YTL/min (inc.
VAT).
Therefore, Telecommunications Authority intervened the retail mobile telecommu-
nications market for the first time. Compared to the regulations in EU member
states, the regulation of a retail market in mobile telecommunications industry
would be regarded as a radical decision. However, the structural problems men-
tioned in this section would provide solid explanations for the differences between
European mobile markets and Turkish mobile market that would justify this de-
cision of Telecommunications Authority. On the other hand, the requirements of
the decision regarding on-net calls were not applied by Turkcell and a court case
was initiated against the decision. As a result, the Council of State has decided
the stay of execution for the implementation of the decision due to the reason that
Telecommunications Authority does not have the authority to determine lower limit
for the retail prices according to the concession agreement.
As a result, the long incumbency period with late entries after 7 years, the lack
of necessary regulations to create a more competitive environment in Turkish mo-
bile market in the early years of the entry such as national roaming and facility
sharing, the lack of regulations regarding interconnection rates and mobile number
14
portability would be argued to be the reasons of consumers’ switching costs in Turk-
ish mobile market. These switching costs are said to affect the pricing strategies
of the firms significantly in Turkish mobile market. When compared to European
mobile telecommunications markets, Turkish mobile market lacks the regulatory
measures such as number portability so far and effective control on interconnection
charges in the early years of the new entries until the las quarter of 2003. These
regulations have been proved to have positive impacts on the establishment of ef-
fective competition and negative impacts on the prices through reducing switching
costs of subscribers. Therefore, Turkish retail mobile telecommunications may be
subject to regulatory supervision or at least requires necessary regulations to be
implemented urgently such as mobile number portability and cost-oriented inter-
connection regime. In this context, the motivation of this paper is based on the
switching costs, which have arisen as a result of lack of effective implementation of
necessary regulations in Turkish mobile market and are considered to have signifi-
cant impact on the pricing strategies of operators.
3 Literature Review
This chapter will provide a literature review about the previous works on the con-
cepts discussed within the context of my model. With reference to factors con-
tributing the competitiveness of the mobile markets and having significant impact
on price levels, the concepts that will discussed could be listed as price discrimina-
tion between on-net and off-net calls, asymmetry between networks, call externali-
ties in the market and existence of consumers’ switching cots. Presentation of these
works will not only provide a background on the literature but also will indicate
the contributions of my study.
I will be using the widely-used competing interconnected network model which is
mainly based on the competition on a Hotelling Line. In this setting, the operators
are placed in the two ends of a unit line and consumers place themselves along the
same line according to their tastes. Each consumer will prefer buying the product
or the service from one of the firms by incurring transportation costs in order to
go to the end of the line where their preferred firm is located from the point they
placed themselves. On the other hand, they receive a utility from buying their
preferred firm so that each consumer will subscribe to one of the firms according
to their net surpluses. Consequently, there will be a consumer who is indifferent
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between purchasing from either firms. Thus, the location of indifferent consumer
will reveal the market share of the firms due to the fact that all consumers up to
the point of indifferent consumer will buy from the first firm and the consumers
ahead of the indifferent consumers’ point will buy from the second firm. This
model of competing firms under the existence of transportation costs is introduced
by Hotelling (1929). As a result, in my model, the mobile operators are placed in
the two ends of a Hotelling Line and subscriber will place themselves according to
their preferences and make their subscription decisions by taking into consideration
the utilities from making receiving calls.
The model of competing interconnected networks which provides the backbone
of of my study was first initiated by Armstrong (1998) and LRT (1998a). Briefly,
the main focus of these papers was the determination of the effects of collusive
access charges over the retail prices. However, these works were developed under
the assumption that consumers derive utility from only making calls but do not
get utility from receiving calls. In the model presented in LRT (1998a), two-part
tariff pricing strategy is proposed for the operators so that each operator charges
their own subscribers a fixed fee and a single price for both on-net and off-net calls.
In addition, rather than using a general form of utility and demand, LRT (1998a)
introduce a utility function which yields a constant elasticity demand function.
Within the context of the study, they examine whether established networks could
not use their interconnection agreements to enforce collusive behavior. Thus, they
suggest that under some conditions over the level of utility, there exists a certain
value above which there would be no equilibrium access price. Moreover, they
provide a Ramsey benchmark for the level of access charges and find out that
the Ramsey access charge is smaller than the marginal cost of access, however the
monopoly access charge exceeds the marginal cost of access. Therefore, these works
are suitable for providing a backbone to my model due to the fact that these are
the seminal works in the literature of competing interconnected networks.
In the model of interconnected networks in which operators pay each other
access charges and network externality becomes important, operators would like
to discriminate prices between on-net and off-net calls. For the reason that firms
would be facing net outflow calls if their only strategy is lowering non-discriminated
retail prices, then the firms choose price discrimination in order to manipulate
amount of incoming and outgoing calls. As mentioned in the previous section, on-
net/off-net price discrimination have been used in order to modify traffic balance
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between operators in Turkish mobile telecommunications market and acquire more
subscribers since they are concerned with the amount of calls they receive and
the fact that they can make a greater amount of cheaper on-net calls when they
subscribe to a network with a larger subscriber base. On the other hand, high
off-net pricing would be purely based on the incentive to decrease the amount of
outgoing calls so that off-net prices would be set excessively above cost which is
expected to decrease consumer surplus.
Therefore, concerning the effects of price discrimination mentioned, the models
with price discrimination are of keen interest from my view point. LRT(1998b)
provide a valid starting point for price discrimination between on-net and off-net
calls. In that paper, they showed that price discrimination would be favored by the
incumbents in the case of absence of large scale entry and price discrimination of the
incumbent would be opposed by the late entrants and consumers. LRT (1998b) also
impose a sort of utility function which yields constant elasticity demand function
similar to the non-discriminatory companion paper. LRT (1998b) mainly examine
how the nature of competition is affected by the possibility of price discrimination
and find out that network externalities exist if the access price embodies a positive
markup over marginal cost such that a network discriminates against the rival
network. They define this type of discrimination as neither cost-based nor demand-
based discrimination but as a clear distortion so that this discrimination introduces
a misallocation of resources on the demand side in order to modify traffic balances
favorably. Under linear pricing, if the two networks are poor substitutes and if
there is a markup on access, social welfare is higher under price discrimination
than under uniform pricing. LRT (1998b) also provide a useful result such that
if the access charge is small and close to marginal cost or the networks are poor
substitutes, then there exists a unique symmetric and stable equilibrium.
Later then, Gans and King (2001) analyzed the access pricing strategies of firms
under a model of price discrimination with two part tariff and showed that the firms
would have incentive to set access charges below their marginal costs. An interest-
ing outcome of Gans and King (2001) indicates that the price competition, even
under price discrimination, would be softened in the case of using Bill-and-Keep
method in interconnection pricing which means zero access charges between opera-
tors. On the other hand, also Peitz (2005) analyzed the level of access charges in a
two-part tariff structure with termination-based price discrimination. In addition,
Peitz (2005) introduced an asymmetric market into his model and reached the con-
clusion that providing an access markup for the new entrant operator, both the
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profits of this operator and more importantly consumer surplus increase. In fact,
Peitz(2005) follows the framework developed by LRT (1998b) for both the pricing
and costing structure which is differentiated by the introduction of asymmetric ac-
cess prices in favor of the late entrant operator. In this setting, he conducts the
analysis for access prices around the cost concerning the impacts of asymmetric
access prices over the profits of the late entrant, consumer surplus and subscription
prices. Additionally, De Bijl and Peitz (2002) showed that equilibrium on-net and
off-net call prices would be set at cost and the differential could be determined by
nothing but access charges. Similar to Peitz (2005), they also showed that asym-
metric access charges increase both the entrants profits and consumer welfare. De
Bijl and Peitz (2002) construct their model with a lot of variations such as asym-
metries in consumers’ demand and already-established customer base for one of
the networks. However, this paper differs from my work due to the fact that they
examine the effects of asymmetric access charges over the profits and consumer
welfare rather than examining retail pricing strategies. They finally conclude that
regulator may use asymmetric access prices as a tool in order to facilitate the entry,
so that in the long term competition intensifies. Jeon, Laffont and Tirole (2004)
provided a seminal work for the literature of price discrimination in which they
analyze the Receiving-Party-Pays (RPP) regimes which require subscriber to pay
reception charges when they receive calls. In their model, they introduced a five-
part tariff which includes on-net and off-net prices for both outgoing and incoming
calls and fixed fee. They followed the same framework developed by LRT (1998b)
in terms of utility and profit functions. Moreover, they introduced the concept of
call externality by assuming that consumers obtain utility not only from making
calls but also from receiving calls. In this context, they provide analyses regarding
reception charges by concentrating on the symmetric equilibria. In the subsection
where they analyzed the effects of absence of reception charges, they constructed a
model without reception charges so that the mentioned model constitutes a suitable
framework for the model I used in this paper. Hence, they provided that on-net
calls are priced under cost due to the internalization of call externality and more-
over they indicated that off-net prices would go to infinity depending on the level
of call externality so that consumers do not make any demand for off-net calls.
As a result, JLT (2004) provides that connectivity break-down would occur due to
the fact that operators would set off-net prices going to infinity at some region of
market shares under the absence of reception charges.
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In telecommunications markets, the size of networks would be very important so
that networks may use the advantage of their sizes by providing network externality.
In this respect, asymmetry between the sizes of networks could serve as a compet-
itive advantage for the larger networks. However, many works in the literature
of interconnected networks study the symmetric equilibrium. In contrast, Carter
and Wright (1999) introduced a pre-defined asymmetry such as brand loyalty to
the consumers’ utility functions for one of the networks so that market is shared
asymmetrically between the operators. In that paper, they followed the compet-
ing interconnected networks model developed by LRT (1998b) by introducing an
asymmetry to the utility functions of the operators and they ultimately showed that
non-reciprocal access prices would be used by the incumbent as a barrier to entry.
In addition, Carter and Wright (2003) kept using the asymmetry component in the
utility functions of consumers and showed that incumbent operators would strictly
prefer reciprocal access charge set at cost. Even though two-part tariff structure
was used in these papers, termination-based price discrimination was not taken into
consideration and main focus of these are concentrated around the determination
of access prices. In this paper, I introduced the asymmetry by assuming that one
firm, the incumbent, penetrates the whole market in the first period as the sole
operator. Then the second period, which is the core interest of my work, starts
with a mass of attached customers to the incumbent bearing switching costs in the
case of subscribing the other network, the new entrant. Therefore, the switching
costs introduced into the utility functions of consumers in this paper resemble the
pre-defined asymmetry element included in the utility functions of consumers by
Carter and Wright (1999, 2003).
The concept of call externality, which means consumers get utility from receiv-
ing calls, is an undeniable feature of telecommunications sector. In this respect,
the concept of call externality becomes very important. The models, which take
into consideration the utility of receiver consumers in addition to the utility of
caller consumers, were introduced by Kim and Lim (2001), JLT (2004), Wright
(2002a), DeGraba (2003), Berger (2004, 2005), Valletti and Houpis (2005), and
Valetti and Cambini (2006). The inclusion of call externalities to the models was
mainly necessitated by the examination of Receiving Party Pays principle. In the
case that subscribers derive utility from receiving calls, Kim and Lim (2001) exam-
ine how Receiving Party Pays Principle (RPP) contributes to the internalization of
the call externalities. They introduce two models where the first model stands for
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a monopoly which is out of the scope of this paper and the second model consists
of the introduction of call externalities to the model of LRT (1998a) with the net-
works competing in linear prices. In both models they assume that access charge
is not regulated but determined cooperatively under the existence of the reception
charges with linear pricing of calls. Briefly, their results indicate that the price
of calls decreases with the existence of RPP principle however the access charge
is higher. Furthermore, within the RPP concept, JLT (2004)find out that calling
charges should be set below the marginal cost of a call due to the internalization
of call externality and also come up with the result that connectivity break down
would arise if networks discriminate prices between on-net and off-net calls as stated
earlier in the previous paragraph. Moreover, Berger (2004) conducts an analysis re-
garding the impacts of reciprocal access charges in a model of network competition
under linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination while introducing
call externalities to the model and Berger (2005) makes the same analysis under
non-linear pricing (two-part tariffs). Moreover, Cambini and Valetti (2006) also
introduce call externalities to their model under the assumption of calls made and
received are complements to each other. In that study, they showed that operators
set positive reception charges only when access charges are sufficiently low.
Finally, it would be beneficial to mention the related literature regarding the
concept of switching costs which constitutes the significant part of my study. The
effects of switching costs over the competition were analyzed in several works by
Klemperer. First, in the models for two-period markets Klemperer (1987a) showed
that firms set lower prices in the first period to attract consumers so that they
can exploit those attached customers later in the second period with the advantage
of switching costs. It that paper, Klemperer (1987a) introduces a model where a
fraction ν of second-period consumers is new comers in the market, and a fraction
1 − ν − ρ of first-period consumers remain in the market which have unchanged
preferences across periods. In this setting, a fraction ρ of consumers have tastes
for product characteristics in the second period that are independent of their first-
period tastes. This situation means that the second period location of these con-
sumers on the line segment is independent of their first-period location. Moreover,
a fraction ν of first-period consumers leave the market after the first period and are
replaced by new consumers with the same fraction, who are uniformly distributed
along the line. The remaining consumers with a fraction of 1−ν−ρ have unchanged
tastes for the product characteristics. Similar to my model, that article examines
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a two-period differentiated-products market in which a fraction of the consumers
are locked-in through switching costs that they face in the second period in the
case that they would like to change their product supplier. However, the switching
costs exist for both firms in Klemperer’s model, which is not the case in the model
presented in this paper. Additionally, Klemperer (1987a) constructs a model of
two competing firms rather than interconnected networks so that consumers of one
product are not affected by the number of consumers who adopt the same product.
Moreover, the consumers’ utility are modeled by simply prices so that consumers
make their decisions based on the price of firms just as in Hotelling (1929)’s model.
On the other hand, Klemperer (1987a) does not restrict firms to charging the same
price in every period so that they would be able to exert the monopoly power
that switching costs give them. As a result he finds that firms would like to raise
their prices in the second period to take advantage of customers locked in to the
firms through the first-period purchase choice. Klemperer (1987a) concludes that
increasing the fraction ρ of consumers whose tastes change between the periods
increases the market’s competitiveness. However, if all consumers’ tastes remain
constant such that ρ = 0 , prices and profits of the firms are higher in both periods.
Then, Klemperer (1987b) analyzed the relationship between the level of switch-
ing costs and entry deterrence in a classic entry deterrence game setting where a
potential entrant observes the period-one output (or the market price) of the in-
cumbent firm and decides whether to enter the market by incurring a fixed cost. As
a result, he showed that the incumbent would like to serve only to repeat consumers
rather than new ones and would encourage entry under high switching costs. An
important point of this article has been that the incumbent monopolist will charge
lower prices in the first period compared to the case that it has unthreatened by
the entry. This is due to the fact that the incumbent would like to limit the effect
of entry by offering low prices in the first period and obtaining a significant amount
of consumers in the market and then serving only to those customers in the second
period and not competing for the new ones aggressively. Similar to the articles
of Klemperer (1987a) and (1987b), Klemperer (1987c) also examines a two-period
market where in this case the switching costs are not the same for each consumer
so that he defines a distribution function that determined the proportion of a firm’s
consumers whose cost of switching to the other firm is less than a particular dif-
ference. In this setting, a firm sells only to its own consumers with switching costs
greater than or equal to the difference of prices of the firms and to those of other
firm’s consumers with switching costs less than or equal to price difference. As a
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result, he shows that switching costs lead to monopoly returns which in fact provide
greater competition in the early stages of the market. In contrast, the total welfare
is inferred to decrease so that the model provide support for the regulatory actions
in lowering switching costs.
Similarly, Klemperer (1989) indicated that the incumbent would lower its price
in the period before entry in order to lock-in customers and then undermine the
effect of the entry. Moreover, in a comprehensive study, Klemperer (1995)analyze
the choice of the incumbent firms between setting a low price to capture the whole
market in the second period and setting a high price to harvest the profits from
its locked-in customers under the effect of entry, interest rates, exchange rates
expectations etc. In this setting he uses classical Klemperer model in a four-period
market where in period 1 a dominant firm enters as a monopolist and in period 2
the dominant firm is again a monopolist. Whereas, in period 3 the dominant firm
faces an entry so that it chooses a quantity which causes the new entrants taking
this quantity as given and acting competitively and in the last period, the dominant
firm again chooses its quantity first and the period-3 entrants then choose quantities
taking the dominant firm’s output as given. Klemperer tests various scenarios such
that he imposes small switching costs first and then larger later. As a result, the
entry of new firms are proven to lead price wars which is assumed to be caused
by the entry of new consumers who are not yet committed to any firm. If a small
fraction of consumers leaves the market and is replaced by new consumers in each
period, price wars arise.
Furthermore, Farrell and Shapiro (1988) extends the model into a multi-period
overlapping generations environment and discovered that the incumbent firm with
attached customers would have incentive to serve them and leave new buyers to its
rival. However, these works are just extended forms of price competition with in
a two (or multi) period Hotelling setup. Therefore, the concepts of interconnected
firms, call externalities, price discrimination are not included in those works.
Recently, Lopez (2007) introduced the concept of switching costs to the model of
LRT(1998a) in which price discrimination and call externalities were not also taken
into consideration but the model represents interconnected networks. He assumed
that each consumer’s second-period preferences are independent of his first-period
preferences, so that consumers’ preferences may change over time. Under reciprocal
access charges set by a regulator or negotiated between operators at the beginning
he models a two-period dynamic market where second period prices and profits
affect the first period decisions of the firms and also switching costs exist for both
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firms. However, he does not specify a utility function form for the consumers
and behaves utility as a welfare variable whereas the consumers are not myopic so
that they recognize that if a network decreases its first-period fixed fee, it will build
market share in order to exploit in the second period by increasing its second-period
fixed fee due to the existence of switching costs. Lopez (2007) mainly analyzes the
effects of mark-up over access charges so that in his study Lopez (2007) showed that
firms profits increase as access charges depart from the marginal costs. His article
shows that when there is dynamic competition and operators are non-myopic, then
they would use access charges to soften competition.
The model studied in this thesis is most similar to that presented by Hoernig
(2007) due to the fact that he analyzed the pricing behavior of the firms under
the concepts of interconnected asymmetric networks, call externalities, price dis-
crimination. In mentioned paper, Hoernig followed the CPP version of the model
generated by JLT (2004) and introduced a pre-defined asymmetry to the consumers’
utility functions for one of the networks following Carter and Wright (1999, 2003)
similar to switching costs in this thesis and analyzed a limited form of predatory
pricing within firms’ pricing strategies. This thesis will differ from Hoernig (2007)
in a single point such that there will be a mass of consumers exiting the market
and new ones replacing them in the second period.
4 The Model
This model has been constructed over the common framework used in the literature
so that interconnected networks are positioned at the two ends of a Hotelling line
according to product characteristics and consumers place themselves along the same
line according to their preferences. Thus, the position of firm 1 is the point 0 and
the position of firm 2 is the point 1 which are denoted as x1 = 0 and x2 = 1.
This model follows a joint framework composed of the models constructed by LRT
(1998b), Carter and Wright (2003) and JLT (2004). Therefore, a customer located
at x and choosing to subscribe to network i has a transportation cost of t|x− xi|.
The utility of a customer with income y and located at x from joining network
i is determined by the following equation in the models mentioned above:
y + v0 − t|x− xi|+ wi.
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where v0 is the utility gained from being joined to a network, t represents per-unit
transportation cost along the Hotelling line which is measured by 1
2σ
where σ stands
for the substitutability measure between two networks and wi is the net surplus of
customers from calls made and received when joined to the network i.
At the retail level, the firms will be allowed to make price discrimination in their
tariffs and then I will restrain the firms’ pricing strategies by non-discrimination
obligation as a policy option. Thus, in the existence of price discrimination the
firm i will offer a three part tariff {Fi, pii, pij} following the notation of JLT(2004).
Here, Fi is the fixed fee of the tariff package, pii represents the retail price of on-net
calls and pij stands for the retail price of off-net calls where i 6= j.
Demand function of customers is denoted by q(·). Thus, the demand of callers
from network i is given by q(pii) for on-net calls and q(pij) for off-net calls. Following
this notation, indirect utility function of a customer from making on-net or off-net
calls can be denoted as
v(p) = maxq{u(q)− pq}.
Since the derivative of consumer surplus is expected to give the demand function
of consumers, then I add the following assumption for the indirect utility such that
v′(p) = −q(p).
Furthermore, there will be customers in the market with a mass of 1 and I
make the assumption that the market is fully covered by the networks such that
s1 + s2 = 1 where si denotes the market share of network i. Moreover, the market
is assumed to be fully owned by the incumbent and a new entrant comes into the
market in the second period. Meanwhile, customers with a mass of µ stays in the
market while the rest of customers with a mass of 1 − µ leave the market at the
beginning of the second period and new customers with the same population replace
leaving customers. Therefore, there exists attached customers with a mass of µ who
have already been subscribed to the incumbent and face switching cost of s in the
case of subscribing to the new entrant in the second period. As well, there will be
unattached new customers who do not face any switching costs whichever network
they subscribe. In addition, throughout my model I will assume the balanced calling
24
pattern such that the customer of each network makes on-net and off-net calls
proportional to the market share of networks. Henceforth, the following equation
will represent the net surplus of an unattached customer:
wi = si(v(pii) + βq(pii)) + (1− si)(v(pij) + βq(pji))− Fi (1)
In the above, v(pii) and v(pij) represent the indirect utilities from making calls
where si of them will stay inside the network and 1− si of them will be outgoing to
the other network. Additionally, the utility of receiving a call with duration q has
been included in the above equation as βq for either on-net or off-net calls. Here
I use the assumption developed by Armstrong and Wright (2007) such that each
subscriber gets a linear utility from receiving calls from other subscribers. The last
term in the equation stands for the retail fixed fee paid by customers. Moreover,
attached customers will receive an extra disutility of s from switching in the case
of subscribing to the new entrant and then w1 and w2 − s will represent their net
surpluses from subscribing to the incumbent and the new entrant respectively.
The location of indifferent customer along the Hotelling line will provide for the
market share of network 1 due to the fact that all customers from the point 0 to the
location of indifferent customer will strictly prefer network 1 and the rest beyond
this point will subscribe to network 2. According to the Hotelling’s model, before
making the purchase (or here subscription) decision, consumers make expectations
regarding the market shares of the firms since market shares influence their utilities
directly. If these expectations of consumers are rational then the resulting market
share determined by the location of indifferent customer should be equal to the
expected market shares. This concept is called as ”rational expectations” which
is a necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist. Since there will be two types
of customers either attached or unattached, then I will solve for the locations of
indifferent customers for these two groups separately. First of all, the location of
indifferent customer among attached customers, which is represented by xs where
s denotes the existence of switching costs, would be calculated by equating utilities
offered by two networks such that,
y + v0 − t|xs − x1|+ w1 = y + v0 − t|xs − x2|+ w2 − s (2)
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where x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 as stated earlier. Therefore, by substituting t =
1
2σ
the
location of indifferent attached customer can be solved as
xs =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2 + s) (3)
Then, the location of indifferent customer among unattached customers, which
is represented by xn where n denotes the non-existence of switching costs, would
be similarly calculated by equating utilities offered by two networks such that,
y + v0 − t|xn − x1|+ w1 = y + v0 − t|xn − x2|+ w2 (4)
where again x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 as stated earlier and similarly I solve for the location
of indifferent unattached customer by substituting t = 1
2σ
such as
xn =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2) (5)
As a result of the distribution of both attached and unattached customers to
the networks, the market share of the incumbent firm can be determined by s1 =
µxs + (1 − µ)xn. Therefore, the resulting market share of the incumbent can be
solved as the following:
s1 =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2) + µσs (6)
Remember that equation (1)indicates that wi is dependent on the market share
si. Thus, if I substitute the equation (1) into the equation (6)and solve for s1 with
the early assumption of s2 = 1− s1 then I obtain the following equation for s1.
s1 =
1/2 + µσs+ σ(h12 − h22 − F1 + F2)
1 + σ(h12 + h21 − h11 − h22) (7)
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where hij = v(pij) + βq(pji) for simplifying the notation as suggested by Hoernig
(2007). Similarly, the results obtained in (6) and (7) resemble to the results of
Hoernig, thus I would be able to conduct analyses similar to those of Hoernig(2007).
First of all, in order to obtain a well defined s1, the denominator of the equation
(7) should be positive since the market share should be decreasing by F1. This
assumption eliminates the corner solution so that the market can not be penetrated
by only one of the operators.
In this setting, both firms bear fixed cost f for providing communication to
each customer and have constant marginal costs c for both call origination and
termination. Here, I make two essential assumptions that both networks have the
same costs and additionally call origination and termination costs are equal. On the
other hand, each call-receiving firm charges an access price a from the caller firm
in order to terminate calls. Moreover, two significant assumptions have been made
such that the access prices of both firms are equal to each other reciprocally and in
addition equal to the cost of termination, c. Since I do not analyze how firms and
regulators should choose the access prices within the context of this paper, then
those assumptions are valid for the setting of this paper. Additionally, it has been
shown that pricing equilibrium exists when a is sufficiently close to c, then I impose
this assumption for both simplicity and a stable equilibrium.
As stated earlier, the profit functions of networks are adopted from the frame-
work initiated by LRT(1998b) and developed in JLT(2004). In line with those
works, mobile networks will decide {Fi, pii, pij} in order to maximize their profits.
However, for the simplification of the optimization process I would make a change
of variables so that the networks will decide market shares si instead of fixed fees
Fi and then the equilibrium values for fixed fees will be obtained through the first
order conditions for market shares.
Mobile networks’ profit functions will be composed of the components of on-net
and off-net revenues, access revenues and costs of calls. The following equation
represents profit function of a mobile network which is particularly adopted from
JLT(2004).
pii = si[si(pii−2c)q(pii)+(1−si)(pij−c−a)q(pij)+(1−si)(a−c)q(pji)+(Fi−f)] (8)
27
where
(i) the first term stands for the profit from on-net calls, which constitute si
percent of all calls, with the price of pii, the cost of 2c for both origination and
termination, and the length of q(pii) ;
(ii) the second term represents the profit from off-net calls, which constitutes
1− si percent of whole calls, with the price of pij, the cost of c for origination and
a for termination, and the length of q(pij)
(iii) the third term represents the profit from access charges with the price of
a, the cost of c for termination, and the length of q(pji) received from the other
operator.
(iv) the fourth term represents the profit from fixed fee with the price of Fi, the
cost of f .
Before moving onto the optimization phase, I would obtain the responses of
fixed fees for the changes in on-net and off-net prices due to the fact that fixed fees
are determined by the firms according to their prices as well. Thus, I would regard
fixed fee Fi as a function of on-net and off-net prices which would be denoted by
Fi(pii, pij).
First of all, the rate of change of fixed fee Fi with respect to market share si
would be obtained through the equation (6). Taking the derivative of this equation
with respect to both fixed fee and market share, I will be able to obtain ∂Fi
∂si
as the
following:
∂F1
∂s1
= − 1
σ
+ (h11 + h22 − h12 − h21) (9)
similarly, substituting s2 = 1 − s1 in the equation (6) and conducting the same
operations made for ∂F1
∂s1
, the following gives us ∂F2
∂s2
:
∂F2
∂s2
= − 1
σ
+ (h11 + h22 − h12 − h21) (10)
Furthermore, I require the rate of change of fixed fees with respect to on-net
and off-net prices. The equations for the derivatives of fixed fees with respect to
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on-net and off-net prices would be obtained with the same operations through the
equation (6). The results are as follows:
∂F1
∂p11
= s1[
∂
∂p11
v(p11) + β(
∂
∂p11
q(p11) ) ] (11)
∂F1
∂p12
= (1− s1)[ ∂
∂p12
v(p12) ]− s1β[ ∂
∂p12
q(p12) ] (12)
moreover, substituting s2 = 1− s1 in the equation (6) and making the same oper-
ations, I obtain the following results:
∂F2
∂p22
= (1− s1)[ ∂
∂p22
v(p22) + β(
∂
∂p22
q(p22) ) ] (13)
∂F2
∂p21
= s1[
∂
∂p12
v(p12) ]− (1− s1)β[ ∂
∂p12
q(p12) ] (14)
In this context, profit maximizing on-net prices by keeping the market share
and off-net prices constant would be obtained from the first order condition ∂pi
∂pii
+
∂pi
∂Fi
∂Fi
∂pii
= 0 under the assumption that other firm’s market share, on-net price
and off-net price are given. Therefore the following expression gives the partial
derivative of networks’ profits with respect to on-net prices:
s2i (
∂
∂pii
q(pii) )[ pii − 2c+ β ] = 0
Solving the above first order condition for on-net prices of both firms, I obtain the
following equations:
p11 = p22 = 2c− β (15)
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Furthermore, similar to on-net prices, profit maximizing off-net prices by keeping
the market share and on-net prices constant would be obtained from the following
first order condition under the assumption that other firm’s market share, on-net
price and off-net price are given.
si(
∂
∂pij
q(pij) )[ (1− si)pij + (si − 1)(a+ c)− siβ ] = 0
If the above first order condition is solved for off-net prices of both firms, equilibrium
off-net prices result as follows:
p12 = a+ c+
s1
1− s1β (16)
p21 = a+ c+
1− s1
s1
β (17)
The equilibrium fixed fees can be calculated by using the method of change of
variables so that I would like to optimize networks’ profits with respect to market
shares first by keeping the on-net and off-net prices constant under the assumption
that other firm’s market share, on-net price and off-net price are given. In this
manner, the expression ∂pi
∂si
+ ∂pi
∂Fi
∂Fi
∂si
= 0 will provide for the first order condition for
market shares. (Please see the appendix for the full expression of FOC of market
shares.) Thus, the case is such that I have two FOCs for s1 and s2 and the implicit
equation 7 for the market share and on the other hand equilibrium values for F1,
F2 and s1 should be obtained. Then, solving the first order condition of market
shares for fixed fees, the equilibrium fixed fees would be obtained.
The equilibrium fixed fees for both firms, F1 and F2, obtained through the
expression
∂pi
∂si
+
∂pi
∂Fi
∂Fi
∂si
= 0 (18)
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will help us with solving the equilibrium market shares.(Please see the appendix
for the full expressions of equilibrium fixed fees.) Therefore, it will be sufficient to
substitute the equilibrium fixed fees into the implicit equation of market share (7)
in order to obtain the equilibrium market shares.
To conclude this section, the equilibrium values of on-net and off-net prices,
fixed fees and market shares of the mobile telecommunications networks have been
derived under the existence of asymmetric switching costs. Therefore, I would be
able to conduct analyses regarding the effects of switching costs on the decisions of
firms in the next section.
5 Equilibrium Under Price Discrimination
In this section, I will be providing my findings regarding the equilibrium pricing
strategies of firms under the existence of switching costs and discuss the results
obtained in the previous section. Moreover, the change in equilibrium price levels
with respect to the access charges will also be provided in the subsection.
5.1 Equilibrium Pricing Strategies
Within the context of this section, I will investigate how switching costs affect
equilibrium prices. In particular, the reaction of prices to switching costs will
analyzed when switching costs are very small, hence close zero. Additionally, I will
make analyses at the point a = c as mentioned in the earlier paragraphs since it
has been shown that equilibrium exists when a is sufficiently close to c.
As a starting point, I could analyze the equilibrium on-net and off-net pricing
decisions of the firms regarding equations (15), (16), and (17). First of all, the
equation (15) suggest that the equilibrium on-net prices of firms will be equal to
each other as long as two firms incur the same call origination and termination
costs of c and on-net calls will be priced below the marginal cost 2c with a reduc-
tion corresponding to the call externality β due to the fact that firms would like
internalize the call externality.
Second, equations (16) and (17) reveal that the off-net prices of firms are corre-
lated with their market shares so that the firms would like to charge higher off-net
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prices as their market shares increase. Here, I would obtain following two results
significant for my further analyses.
Lemma 1 For any equilibrium market share si ∈ (0, 1), off-net prices of the net-
works will increase (decrease) as their (competitor’s) market share increases:
∂pij
∂si
=
β
(1− si)2 > 0 (19)
With reference to Lemma1 (19), under the assumption that market share of the
incumbent is greater than the entrant’s market share so that it’s more than 1/2, I
would conclude that the incumbent’s off-net price will be greater than the entrant’s
off-net price. This solution could be explained by the fact that the incumbent firm
seizes the opportunity of having a bigger network so that it internalizes the call
externality more by applying a bigger mark-up over the cost while determining
off-net prices stated in the equation (16). However, with reference to equation
(15), it would be seen that on-net prices are not affected by the switching costs.
Furthermore, Lemma 1 (19) implies that the operators apply a mark-up for call
externality so that in the case that β = 0 there will not be such a mark-up for call
externality in the equilibrium off-net prices.
Lemma 2 For any equilibrium on-net and off-net prices, p11 and p12 respectively,
for switching cost close enough to zero market share of the incumbent firm will
increase as the switching cost s increases:
∂s1
∂s
|s=0> 0 (20)
Proof. With reference to the equation (7) that gives the equilibrium market share
of the incumbent firm, I infer that s1 will decrease as fixed fee F1increases when on-
net and off-net prices are set at the equilibrium values determined by the equations
(15), (16) and (17. Then the following result will hold:
∂s1
∂F1
=
−σ
1 + σ(h12 + h21 − h11 − h22) < 0
Let B = 1 + σ(h12 + h21 − h11 − h22) for the simplicity. Then, obviously B > 0
from the above equation for small enough σ. Since the networks will be symmetric
without switching cots (s = 0) under the initial assumption of a = c, then I would
make further assumptions of p11 = p22, p12 = p21 and s1 = s2 = 1/2. Thus, B turns
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into a new equation under the assumptions just mentioned. Let this new equation
is called A.
The derivative of the incumbent’s market share s1 with respect to the switching
cost s with the substitutions of a = c and p11 = p22, p12 = p21 and s1 = s2 = 1/2
is as follows:
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 = (1− s1)
2s1
2σµ
3A+ 4σβ[q(p21) + q(p22)]
> 0
Then, further conclusions can be derived from Lemma2 literally such that a
small increase in the switching costs in favor of the incumbent firm will cause an
increase in the incumbent firm’s market share.
Proposition 1 For switching costs very close to zero, equilibrium off-net prices of
the incumbent firm increases with a small increase in switching costs.
∂p12
∂s
|s=0 > 0 (21)
Proof 1 By using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, such that
∂p12
∂s1
|s=0 > 0
and
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
hold for switching costs small enough. Then,
∂p12
∂s
|s=0 = ∂p12
∂s1
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
which implies that equilibrium off-net price of the incumbent firm increases with an
increase in switching costs in favor the incumbent firm.
With reference to the findings above, Proposition 1 (21) suggests that the in-
cumbent will seize the opportunity of having an already-established customer base
where subscribers incur switching costs when they leave the incumbent and would
like to subscribe to the other network. Even though higher off-net prices of an op-
erator undermines the attractiveness of the operator, this situation creates indirect
effects such as traffic imbalance in favor of the larger network and consumers’ dis-
incentive for subscribing to the smaller network with the concern of not receiving
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much calls from the larger operators’ subscribers. First, higher off-net prices of
larger network will cause less outgoing calls and more incoming calls due to lower
off-net price of smaller network so that an interconnection traffic imbalance in favor
of the incumbent operator will be observed in the market. Regarding Proposition1
(21) it would be argued that the late entrant operator’s interconnection traffic and
payment deficit will be widened if switching costs increase. Thus, one may ar-
gue that absence of necessary regulations that cause asymmetric switching costs in
the market will further distort the competition through interconnection payments.
Second, higher off-net prices of the incumbent operator discourages the potential
subscribers against subscribing to the smaller operator so that the late entrant
operator will face difficulties in subscriber acquisition process.
Proposition 2 For switching costs very close to zero, equilibrium fixed fee of the
incumbent firm increases with a small increase in switching costs.
∂F1
∂s
|s=0 > 0 (22)
Proof 2 Using the equilibrium fixed fees (Please see the appendix for the full ex-
pression.), the following expression can be obtained:
∂F1
∂s1
|s=0 = 1 + 2σ[v(p22)− v(p21) + 2βq(p21)]
σ
(23)
which could be re-written as
∂F1
∂s1
|s=0 = A+ 2σβ[q(p21) + q(p22)]
σ
> 0 (24)
where the result of A > 0 has been obtained in the proof of Lemma 2. Furthermore,
by using the result of Lemma 2, such that
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
hold for switching costs small enough. Then,
∂F1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
which indicates that equilibrium fixed fee of the incumbent firm increases with an
increase in switching costs in favor the incumbent.
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The result obtained in Proposition 2 (22) imply that the ability of the incum-
bent firm at taking excess consumer surplus through fixed fees increases with the
switching costs. This situation could also be explained by demand elasticities such
that demand gets more inelastic as switching costs get higher. Therefore, by using
the advantage of switching costs, the incumbent firm charges more fixed fee and
obtains more consumer surplus.
In the context of regulatory policy, in the next section, I will try to show the
effects of a remedy against price discrimination such that on-net and off-net prices
should be set equal to each other by both of the firms.
5.2 The Effects of Access Charges
This section mainly investigates how access charges affect equilibrium prices under
the existence of switching costs. One would argue that incumbent operator favors
higher access charges as long as it is above cost due to the favorable traffic imbalance
created by higher off-net price.
The analysis will concentrate around the point a = c so that I will try to examine
the effects of an increase in access charges. In this context, the rate of changes at
this point will reveal us how the equilibrium prices will change when access charges
deviate from cost. Since I am going to deal with the responses of off-net prices,
the results presented in Lemma 1 (19) will provide a solid starting point for the
analysis. As mentioned in the previous section, the equation (15) indicates that on-
net calls will be priced below the marginal cost 2c with a reduction corresponding
to the call externality β so that on-net prices are not affected by the changes in
access charges.
Since it has been shown that ∂p12
∂s1
> 0 in Lemma1 (19), then I need to show that
∂s1
∂a
> 0 in order to meet the assumptions made in the beginning of this subsection.
Proposition 3 For any equilibrium on-net and off-net prices, p11 and p12 respec-
tively and for any switching costs s > 0, market share of the incumbent firm will
increase as the access charge a increases under a linear demand function when a is
close to the call termination (and origination) cost c:
∂s1
∂a
|a=c> 0, ∀s1 > 1/2 (25)
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Proof 3 With reference to the equation (6) that gives the equilibrium market share
of the incumbent, derivative of the market share with respect to access charge can
be determined by
∂s1
∂a
|a=c + ∂s1
∂p12
∂p12
∂a
|a=c + ∂s1
∂p21
∂p21
∂a
|a=c (26)
where the term s1 includes the equilibrium values of F1 and F2 obtained by solving
the equation (18) so that there is no need to examine the rate of change of fixed fees
with respect to access charge. The above equation yields the following result:
∂s1
∂a
|a=c= −σs
3
1(−1 + s1)3(s1q(p21)− (1− s1)q(p12)) + C
3A+ 4σβ[q(p21) + q(p22)]
(27)
where C represents the following part of the equation:
C = s21σ(−1 + s1)2β[(s1 − 3s21 + s31)∂q(p12)∂p12 + (−2s1 + s31 + 1)
∂q(p21)
∂p21
]
In the equation (27), the first part other than C is positive since −σs31(−1 + s1)3
is obviously positive, and additionally s1 > (1 − s1) and q(p21) > q(p12) make the
term in parenthesis positive. The crucial point is the sign of C which turns out to
be certainly positive for any kind of demand curve on the region s1 > 0.62 which
ensures that both the term s1 − 3s21 + s31 and the term −2s1 + s31 + 1 are negative.
This is due to the fact that s1 > 0.38 guarantees that the term s1 − 3s21 + s31 is
negative and s1 > 0.62 implies that the term −2s1 + s31 + 1 is negative. However,
if the demand curve is assumed to be the standard constant-slope demand curve,
then I would assume that q′(p12) = q′(p21) for all points on the demand curve, then
the term (s1 − 3s21 + s31) + (−2s1 + s31 + 1) is negative on the region s1 > 1/2.
Furthermore, this result also holds for any demand function which is convex such
that q′′(·) > 0. (Please see the appendix for the graphical results)
With regards to the result obtained in Proposition 3 (25), I would claim that
market share of the dominant firm will increase as the access charge increases.
Therefore, this result satisfies the expectations made in the beginning of this sub-
section such that the incumbent firm will prefer setting higher symmetric access
charges. This incentive may be sustained by the incumbent firm even under asym-
metric access charges depending on the level of asymmetry in interconnection traffic
between the firms. Similarly, the incumbent firm sets higher off-net prices by seizing
the opportunity of switching costs, which in turn results traffic imbalance between
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the operators in favor of the incumbent firm. Thus, the incumbent firm will always
prefer higher symmetric access charges so that a payment imbalance is created in
favor the incumbent firm in interconnection payments between the operators.
Using the result obtained in the Proposition3 (25),the following inference could
be made obviously:
Lemma 3 Off-net price of the incumbent firm increases as the access charge in-
crease at the point a = c.
∂p12
∂a
|a=c +∂p12
∂s1
∂s1
∂a
|a=c> 0 (28)
Proof. With regards to the equation (16) ∂p12
∂a
|a=c= 1 and additionally, using
Lemma 1 (19) which proves that the off-net price of the incumbent firm increases
with its market share and Proposition 3 (25) which implies that the market share
of incumbent firm increases with the access charges, then it would be proven that
the derivative of off-net price with respect to access charge turns out to be positive.
Therefore, it would be concluded that off-net price of the incumbent firm will
increase as the access charge increases.
The result of Lemma3 satisfies the expectation that the incumbent firm will set
higher off-net prices as long as access charges increase in order to create a traffic
imbalance and enjoy the advantage of payment imbalance in favor of itself.
6 Equilibrium Under Non-discriminatory Prices
In this section, I will analyze the results of price non-discrimination if it would
be imposed as a remedy in order to eliminate the effects of switching costs so
that effective competition would be established in the market. The same model
presented in Section 3 will be used in this section with a deviation such that the
firms will be obliged to set equal on-net and off-net prices.
Therefore, the retail level pricing decisions of firm i will consist of a two-part
tariff {Fi, pi} where Fi is the fixed fee of the tariff package and pi stands for the
retail price of both on-net and off-net calls. Thus, the firms’ pricing strategies will
be restrained by non-discrimination obligation as a policy option.
Similar to the demand function presented in Section 3, demand function is
denoted by q(·). Thus, the demand of callers from network i is given by q(pi) for
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on-net and off-net calls. Indirect utility function of a customer from making on-
net or off-net calls will be similarly denoted as v(p) = maxq{u(q) − pq} such that
v′(p) = −q(p) in order to ensure that consumer surplus gives the demand function
of consumers.
The market will be again assumed to be fully covered by the incumbent in the
first period and a new entrant comes into the market in the second period. Similar
to the market introduced in Section 3, customers with a mass of µ will remain in the
market while the rest of customers leave the market at the beginning of the second
period and new customers with the same population (1 − µ)replace the leaving
customers. Thus, the remaining customers with a mass of µ, who have already
been subscribed to the incumbent, will be attached to the incumbent network and
face switching costs of s if they subscribe to the new entrant in the second period.
On the other hand, unattached new customers do not face any switching costs
whichever network they subscribe. Therefore, the following equation will represent
the net surplus of an unattached customer:
wi = v(pi) + siβq(pi) + (1− si)βq(pj)− Fi (29)
where v(pi) represents the indirect utilities from making on-net and off-net calls.
Moreover, the utility derived from receiving a call with duration q is represented as
βq similar to the original model. Again, the assumption of Armstrong and Wright
(2007) such that each subscriber gets a linear utility from receiving calls will be used.
Additionally attached customers will bear an extra disutility of s from switching if
they subscribe to the new entrant such that w1 and w2 − s will represent their net
surpluses from subscribing to the incumbent and the new entrant respectively.
Since the customers are located along the Hotelling, then according to the con-
cept of ”rational expectations” the location of indifferent customer among attached
customers, xs, would be again given by the following equation,
xs =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2 + s) (30)
Then, similarly the location of indifferent unattached customer would be solved
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as
xn =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2) (31)
As a result, the market share of the incumbent firm can be determined by
s1 = µxs + (1− µ)xn. Therefore, the resulting market share of the incumbent can
be solved as the following:
s1 =
1
2
+ σ(w1 − w2) + µσs (32)
Even though the equation (29) includes the term market share si, the resulting
equation for s1 does not contain any term with the market share. In addition,
call externality terms cancel each other in the equation (29) so that there is no
call externality terms either in the resulting formula. Then, the following equation
would be obtained for s1.
s1 =
1
2
+ µσs+ σ(v(p1)− F1(p1)− v(p2) + F2(p2)) (33)
Furthermore, the profit functions of networks are adopted from the framework ini-
tiated by LRT(1998a) for the case of non-discrimination such that mobile operators
will decide {Fi, pi} for their profit maximization. However, for the simplification of
the optimization process, the same change of variables method will be used such
that the networks will decide market shares si instead of fixed fees Fi and then the
equilibrium values for fixed fees will be obtained through the first order conditions
for market shares.
Mobile operators’ profit functions will be composed of the components of rev-
enues from calls, access revenues and costs of calls. The following equation repre-
sents a mobile operator’s profit function adopted from LRT(1998a).
pii = si[si(pi−2c)q(pi)+(1−si)(pi−c−a)q(pi)+(1−si)(a−c)q(pj)+(Fi−f)] (34)
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where again
(i) the first term represents the profit from on-net calls, which constitute si
percent of all calls, with the price of pi, the cost of 2c for both origination and
termination, and the length of q(pi) ;
(ii) the second term stands for the profit from off-net calls, which constitutes
1 − si percent of whole calls, with the non-discriminated price of pi, the cost of c
for origination and a for termination, and the length of q(pi)
(iii) the third term represents the profit from access charges with the price of
a, the cost of c for termination, and the length of q(pj) received from the other
operator.
(iv) the fourth term stands for the profit from fixed fee with the price of Fi, the
cost of f .
Similar to the methodology followed in Section 3 the responses of fixed fees for
the changes in prices would be obtained since the fixed fees are determined by the
firms according to their prices as well. Therefore, fixed fee Fi will be represented
as a function of prices which would be denoted by Fi(pi).
First, the derivative of fixed fee Fi with respect to market share si would be
obtained from the equation (33). Taking the derivative of this equation with respect
to both fixed fee and market share for both firms, ∂Fi
∂si
and ∂F2
∂s2
, will be obtained as
the following:
∂F1
∂s1
=
∂F2
∂s2
= − 1
σ
(35)
Moreover, the derivatives of fixed fees with respect to the non-discriminated
prices would be obtained with the same operations through the equation (33). The
results are as follows:
∂F1
∂p1
=
∂
∂p1
v(p1) = −q(p1) (36)
moreover, substituting s2 = 1 − s1 in the equation (32) and making the same
operations, the following results are obtained:
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∂F2
∂p2
=
∂
∂p2
v(p2) = −q(p2) (37)
Within the similar methodology used in Section 3, profit maximizing prices by
keeping the market share and off-net prices constant will be obtained from the first
order condition ∂pi
∂pi
+ ∂pi
∂Fi
∂Fi
∂pi
= 0 under the assumption that other firm’s market share
and non-discriminated price are given. Thus, the partial derivative of the firms’
profits with respect to non-discriminated price would be given by the following
expression:
s1(
∂
∂p1
q(p1) )[ p1 − (1 + s1)c− (1− s1)a ] = 0
(s1 − 1)( ∂
∂p2
q(p2) )[ s1(a− c)− p2 + 2c ] = 0
Solving the above first order conditions for non-discriminated prices of both firms,
the following equations are obtained:
p1 = s1(c− a) + c+ a (38)
p2 = s1(a− c) + 2c (39)
As mentioned earlier the method of change of variables will be used for the equi-
librium fixed fees so that networks’ profits will be optimized with respect to market
shares first by keeping the non-discriminated price constant under the assumption
that other firm’s market share, non-discriminated price are given. In this context,
the expression ∂pi
∂si
+ ∂pi
∂Fi
∂Fi
∂si
= 0 will provide for the first order condition for market
shares. In this setting, both firms own the same cost structure as mentioned in
the Section 3. Therefore, I will assume that the access prices of both firms are
set symmetrically, and equal to the cost of termination c for both simplicity and
a stable equilibrium. Since the equation (33) represents a rational expectations
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equilibrium, then keeping the values of fixed fees at the level which satisfies the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium and maximization of networks’ profits with respect
to market shares will ultimately provide the equilibrium profit maximizing fixed
fees through a method of change of variables. Thus the first order conditions of
market shares would be solved for fixed fees, the equilibrium fixed fees would be
obtained as follows with the early assumption a = c:
F1 = f +
s1
σ
(40)
F2 = f +
s1
1− σ (41)
Within the context of this section similar to Section 4, I will investigate how
switching costs influence the equilibrium prices. Particularly, the reaction of prices
to switching costs will be analyzed when switching costs are very small, very close
zero, and switching costs tend to increase. Moreover, the analyses will be made at
the point a = c as mentioned earlier since the stable equilibrium exists when a is
sufficiently close to c.
Similarly,the equilibrium pricing decisions of the firms will be analyzed regarding
equations (38) and (39). First of all, it would be inferred that under the symmetric
market shares, the equilibrium non-discriminated prices of firms will be equal to
each other as long as two firms incur the same call origination and termination
costs of c.
Second, equations (38) and (39) indicate that non-discriminated prices of firms
are correlated with their market shares as access charges a are assumed to be slightly
bigger than the cost of origination and termination c. As a result, two significant
findings will help for further analyses.
Lemma 4 For any equilibrium market share si ∈ (0, 1), non-discriminated prices
of the incumbent (new entrant) operator will decrease (increase) as their market
share increases:
∂p1
∂s1
= −a+ c < 0 (42)
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With reference to Lemma4 (42), under the assumption that access charges a are
slightly bigger than the cost of origination and termination c, it would be concluded
that the incumbent’s non-discriminated price will be lower than the entrant’s non-
discriminated price. This finding would be explained by the fact that the incumbent
firm would offer lower unit prices since it has more on-net calls so that it would bear
lower weighted average cost per minute. Furthermore, Lemma 4 (42) implies that
the effect of switching costs over the non-discriminated price will be removed if the
access charges are set at cost (a = c)and an obligation of price non-discrimination
is imposed on the operators.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, market share of the incumbent firm will increase as the
switching cost s increases at the point where switching cost is close enough to zero:
∂s1
∂s
|s=0= −µσ−3 + σ(a− c)(q(p1)− q(p2)) > 0 (43)
Proof. Regarding the above equation, the analysis is made around the point that
switching cost is close enough to zero so that a certain asymmetry is granted in
market shares, thus in prices. Therefore, denominator is obviously negative since
q(p2) > q(p1) makes the term in parenthesis negative under the assumption that
access charges is set slightly above costs a > c. This conclusion clearly holds when
access charges are set at cost, i.e. when a = c we have:
∂s1
∂s
|s=0= µσ
3
> 0 (44)
Then, similar to Lemma2 the same conclusion would be reached from Lemma5
such that a small increase in the switching costs in favor of the incumbent firm will
cause an increase in the incumbent firm’s market share.
Lemmas (4) and (5) together imply the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For switching costs very close to zero, equilibrium non-discriminated
price of the incumbent firm decreases with a small increase in switching costs.
∂p1
∂s
|s=0 < 0 (45)
Proof 4 By using the results of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, such that
∂p1
∂s1
|s=0 < 0
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and
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
hold for switching costs small enough and access charges are set slightly higher
than the costs. Then,
∂p1
∂s
|s=0 = ∂p1
∂s1
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 < 0
which implies that equilibrium non-discriminated price of the incumbent firm de-
creases with an increase in switching costs in favor the incumbent firm.
Notice, however, that a regulatory remedy such that the operators are obliged
to set access charges at cost, a = c, would help removing the effects of switching
costs over the prices of the operators such that;
∂p1
∂s1
|s=0 = −a+ c = 0
Therefore, the derivative of non-discriminated prices for both firms with respect to
the switching costs will be equal to zero and non-discriminated prices of the firms
will be equal to the costs p1 = p2 = 2c.
Concerning the above result, it would be inferred that the effect of call exter-
nality is not taken into consideration in the pricing decision of the firms due to
the balanced calling pattern under non-discriminated prices. With reference to the
findings above, Proposition 4 (45) suggests that the incumbent will use the advan-
tage of having a larger customer base due to the early entry and switching costs
and then will be able to offer lower per-minute price. This result indicates that the
incumbent firm will have incentive to decrease its non-discriminated price as the
switching costs increase so that it would lock-in more consumers with the attractive
lower prices while taking the consumer surplus through fixed fees. The case of lower
per-minute prices for the incumbent will obviously cause traffic and payment imbal-
ance in favor of the new entrant operator, however the new entrant will not receive
any profit from the interconnection payments since the access charges are set at
cost. In contrast, if the access charges are set slightly above costs, the incumbent
firm will continue lowering its per-minute price and the level will decrease as long
as switching costs increase so that the traffic imbalance in favor of the new entrant
will arise in this situation also. However, the new entrant will be able make profits
from interconnection payments since the access charges include some mark-up.
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Since the incumbent offers lower price, then consumer surplus is expected to
be greater compared to the consumers of the new entrant. Thus, the incumbent
firm is expected to take whole excess surplus through fixed fee so that it would be
argued that the fixed fee of the incumbent firm will be higher. I will try to confirm
this expectation in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 For switching costs very close to zero, equilibrium fixed fee of the
incumbent firm increases with a small increase in switching costs.
∂F1
∂s
|s=0 > 0 (46)
Proof 5 Using the equilibrium fixed fee obtained in (40), the following expression
can be obtained:
∂F1
∂s1
|s=0 = 1
σ
(47)
Furthermore, by using the result of Lemma 5, such that
∂s1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
holds for switching costs small enough. Then,
∂F1
∂s
|s=0 > 0
which indicates that equilibrium fixed fee of the incumbent firm increases with an
increase in switching costs in favor the incumbent.
The above result of Proposition 5 (46) implies that the ability of the incum-
bent firm at taking excess consumer surplus through fixed fees increases with the
switching costs. Therefore, by using the advantage of lower weighted average cost
of calls, the incumbent firm charges lower non-discriminated price and obtains more
consumer surplus through higher fixed fee.
In the context of regulatory policy, there would be the following remedy options:
(i) Policy Option 1: Non-discrimination in retail prices. The regulatory body
imposes the obligation of setting non-discriminated prices for the operators which
enable the incumbent operator to lower the per-minute price as switching costs
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increase. This option enables the new entrant to receive profit from the intercon-
nection payments, however the incumbent holds the advantage of increasing its
market share through lower per-minute prices.
(ii) Policy Option 2: Cost-based access charges together with non-discriminated
retail prices. The regulatory authority imposes the obligation of setting cost-based
access charges together with the obligation of setting non-discriminated prices. This
remedy results symmetric per-minute prices and fixed fees for both operators, and
remove the incentive of the incumbent operator for decreasing prices and obtaining
market share through it.
7 Welfare Analysis
With reference to the concept of consumer surplus, the obligation of setting non-
discriminated prices would be welfare-improving depending on the functional form
of the consumers’ demand. However, it turns out that it is quite difficult to obtain
clear results without simplifying the model and eliminating some of the interesting
market characteristics such as asymmetry resulting from switching costs and call
externalities. Intuitively, one would infer that consumer surplus obtained through
lower per-minute prices is taken by the incumbent operator by setting higher fixed
fee so that this situation may not improve the consumers’ surplus. On the other
hand, with a general form demand function under symmetric networks in terms of
market share (so that the switching costs is equal to zero) and very small call exter-
nality, price discrimination becomes welfare-improving for the consumers. However,
these assumptions are quite strong so that the core interest of this paper is fully
eliminated. Therefore, it would be logical to state that under a symmetric market
equilibrium with lower call externalities, price discrimination would be a welfare-
improving alternative in terms of consumer surplus.
In order to conduct an analysis over consumers’ surplus, it would be beneficial
to use the following equation (see Hoernig (2007) pg. 174):
CS = µ{
∫ xs
0
w1(z)dz +
∫ 1
xs
(w2(z)−s)dz}+ (1−µ){
∫ xn
0
w1(z)dz +
∫ 1
xn
w2(z)dz}
First, regarding price discrimination case, plugging the equation (1) for i = 1, 2
into the above equation, the following result would be obtained:
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CSd = s1w1 + (1− s1)w2 − µs(1− xs) + 1
4σ
(2s1 − 1− 2(µx2s + (1− µ)x2n)) (48)
where implicit forms of xs and xn are denoted in the equations (3) and (5), re-
spectively. In addition, consumer welfare functions w1 and w2 are in the general
form denoted by the equation (1)which includes pii, pij and pji whose equilibrium
values are represented by the equations (15), (16) and (17) respectively. In order
to obtain a straightforward result regarding the consumer surplus, I would impose
the following functional forms for consumers demand and indirect utility functions:
d(p) = r − p
v(p) =
(r − p)2
2
where r is y-intercept of the demand function. Then, I will evaluate implicit forms of
xs and xn and general forms of welfare functions by introducing demand function
and indirect utility function whose functional forms have been stated above and
I will insert those functions into the consumer surplus equation with equilibrium
prices. As a result, the equation (48) remains including the parameters a, c, β, µ, σ, r
and s together with the incumbent’s market share s1.
Here, I would like to conduct a comparative statics analysis with the following
values for the parameters: a = 0.1, c = 0.1, β = 0.8, µ = 0.5 and σ = 1. These
values imply that consumers attach value to the incoming calls to a high extent
(β = 0.8), half of the consumers leave the in the second period (µ = 0.5)and then
mobile telecommunication operators are highly substitute to each other σ = 1.
Therefore, the resulting formula for the consumers surplus remains including only
switching costs s and the market share of the incumbent firm s1. Starting with
a symmetric equilibrium s1 = 1/2 which can be satisfied with no switching costs
s = 0, my analysis will show the effect of increasing switching costs from the point
s = 0 over the whole consumer surplus. The following figure shows the change in
consumer surplus with the switching cost in the range of s = 0 to s = 1:
As the Figure (1) indicates, introducing small switching costs in favor of the incum-
bent firms (such that s > 0) causes consumer surplus to decrease under symmetric
equilibrium s1 = s2 = 1/2 for the case that operators are allowed to discriminate
on-net and off-net prices.
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Figure 1: Change in Consumer Surplus with respect to Change in Switching Costs
for Price Discrimination Case
After finding out that an increase in switching costs cause a decrease in consumer
surplus for price discrimination case, it would be beneficial to analyze whether the
effects of switching costs would be reversed in the case that operators are not allowed
to price discriminate. In this context, analyses for the consumer surplus conducted
for price discrimination case will be repeated for the case of non-discriminatory
prices. Therefore, the consumer surplus will be measured with the equation (48)
and the same conversion will be done for the equilibrium values of variables and
parameters, and forms of functions such that the method is as follows again.
Implicit forms of xs and xn are denoted in the equations (30) and (31), respec-
tively. In addition, welfare functions w1 and w2 are in the general form denoted
by the equation (29)which includes pii and pjj whose equilibrium values are repre-
sented by the equations (38) and (39) respectively. Concerning a straightforward
result regarding the consumer surplus, similar to price discrimination case, the fol-
lowing functional forms for consumers demand and indirect utility functions would
be imposed:
d(p) = r − p
v(p) =
(r − p)2
2
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where r is again y-intercept of the demand function. Then, implicit forms of xs
and xn and general forms of welfare functions will be evaluated by introducing
demand function and indirect utility function whose functional forms have been
stated above and those functions will be inserted into the consumer surplus equation
with equilibrium prices. At the end, the consumer surplus equation will remain
including the parameters a, c, β, µ, σ, r and s together with the incumbent’s market
share s1.
Then, it would be beneficial to conduct a comparative statics analysis with
the following values for the parameters similar to the price discrimination case:
a = 0.1, c = 0.1, β = 0.8, µ = 0.5 and σ = 1. Thus, the consumers surplus equation
remains including only switching costs s and the market share of the incumbent
firm s1. Starting with a symmetric equilibrium s1 = 1/2 which can be satisfied
with no switching costs s = 0 that makes analysis less complicated, my analysis
will show how an increase in switching costs from the point s = 0 affects the whole
consumer surplus. The following figure shows the change in consumer surplus with
the switching cost in the range of s = 0 to s = 1:
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Figure 2: Change in Consumer Surplus with respect to Change in Switching Costs
for non-Discriminatory Prices Case
Similar to price discrimination case the Figure (2) indicates the same result such
that introducing small switching costs in favor of the incumbent firms (such that
s > 0) causes consumer surplus to decrease under symmetric equilibrium s1 = s2 =
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1/2 for the case that operators are not allowed to charge discriminated prices.
This chapter states that consumer surplus decreases if switching costs are intro-
duced into the market in both price discrimination and non-discriminatory prices
cases. Moreover, it would be inferred that increasing switching costs from any par-
ticular point would cause a decrease in consumer surplus. One of the results that
can be deducted from the values in y-axis in Figures (1) and (2) is indicating that
consumer surplus is decreasing if non-discriminatory prices are imposed. However,
regarding consumer surplus I have conducted all the analyses stated in this chapter
under symmetric equilibrium the simplicity of the results due to the fact that sym-
metric equilibrium requires zero switching costs. This assumption eliminates one of
the core interests of my paper which is asymmetric networks in size. As a result, it
would be suggested that the best practice could be imposing remedies which elim-
inate switching costs in the market so that the negative effects of switching costs
over the consumer surplus could be removed.
8 Conclusion
This paper has been prepared with the motivation created by the effects of switching
costs over the mobile telecommunications operators’ pricing strategies in the Turk-
ish Mobile Telecommunications Market where long incumbency period caused high
switching costs. Under the interconnected competing networks model developed
by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), the market has been modeled with consumers’
switching costs, call externalities, asymmetric networks and price discrimination
between on-net and off-net calls.
In this setting, I showed that the incumbent mobile operator will have incentive
to set higher off-net prices in order to modify the traffic balance between operators
while attaining its subscribers due to the switching costs so that the network of
new entrant lose its attractiveness due to the fact that its subscribers receive lower
amount of calls from the other operator. This situation causes the existing sub-
scribers to lock-in to the incumbent mobile operator and moreover avoids the new
subscribers from subscribing the new entrant mobile operator. Furthermore, the
analysis regarding the level of access charges indicates that the incumbent opera-
tor’s incentive to set higher access charges increases as the switching costs increase.
Regarding the effects of pricing strategies of the firms over the competitiveness
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of the market, price non-discrimination has been suggested as a regulatory remedy.
In this context, the result of price non-discrimination implies that the incumbent
will prefer setting lower per-minute prices and then it takes the consumer surplus
created by lower per-minute prices through higher fixed fee. However, this remedy
will enable traffic and payment surplus for the new entrant in terms of intercon-
nection. As a final point, I have not been able to obtain general conclusions about
the impact of a non-discrimination remedy on consumer welfare. In contrast, by
eliminating some of the core concepts dealt in this paper such as call externalities
and asymmetry between the operators resulting from the switching costs so that
symmetric equilibrium is reached at the end, the price discrimination has been
found as a welfare-improving alternative for the consumers. However, comparative
statics results indicate that the existence of switching costs in the market decreases
consumer welfare under both price-discrimination and non-discriminatory prices.
Therefore, the best practice to increase consumer welfare would be suggested as
imposing remedies which eliminate or reduce the switching costs in the market
such as the implementation of number portability, prohibition of penalty fees taken
by the operators in the case of cancelation of contracts by subscribers.
In conclusion, I would argue that the incumbent would set higher fixed fee
and off-net price in the case of price discrimination in order to increase its market
share, generate interconnection surplus and create consumer lock-in by seizing the
opportunity of switching costs. Moreover, the incumbent firm will prefer higher
symmetric access charges in the case of price discrimination since the incumbent
firm will enjoy interconnection surplus due to higher off-net prices. On the other
hand, the incumbent firm will continue to use the advantage of switching costs by
setting lower per-minute prices and taking the consumer surplus through higher
fixed fee.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Market Concentration and Market Shares of the Incumbent Firms
in EU and Turkey:
Figure 3: Market Concentration and Market Shares of the Incumbent Firms in EU and
Turkey
A.2 First Order Condition for The Firms’ Profits with respect to
Market Shares
∂pi
∂si
= {si + 2σv(pii)s2i − fiσ + σv(pij)si + Fiσsi − s2i + 3σq(pji)asi − 2σq(pji)as2i
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−3σq(pji)csi + 2σq(pji)cs2i + σβq(pji)si − σβq(pji)s2i + fσ − fσsi − σq(pji)a+
σq(pji)c− 2σv(pii)si+ σv(pji)si− σv(pji)s2i − σv(pij)s2i + s2iβq(pij)σ}/{(−1+ si)σ}
A.3 Equilibrium Fixed Fees in Price-Discrimination Case
F eqi = {−si−2σv(pii)s2i−σsiv(pij)+s2i−3σq(pji)asi+2σq(pji)as2i+3σq(pji)csi−2σq(pji)cs2i
−σsiβq(pji)+σβq(pji)s2i−fσ+fσsi+σq(pji)a−σq(pji)c+2σv(pii)si−siσv(pji)+σv(pji)s2i
+σv(pij)s
2
i − s2iβq(pij)σ}/{(−1 + si)σ}
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A.4 Graphical Expressions for Section 5.2
Change in the value of s1 − 3s21 + s31 with respect to market share s1 which has
been indicated in the first part of C in the Equation (27)
–1
–0.8
–0.6
–0.4
–0.2
0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
s1
Figure 4: Change in the value of s1 − 3s21 + s31 with respect to market share s1
Change in the value of −2s1 + s31 + 1 with respect to market share s1 which has
been indicated in the second part of C in the Equation (27)
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Figure 5: Change in the value of −2s1 + s31 + 1 with respect to market share s1
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Change in the value of C in the Equation (27)with respect to market share s1 if
demand function is linear so that ∂q(p12)
∂p12
= ∂q(p21)
∂p21
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Figure 6: Change in the value of C with respect to market share s1 if demand
function is linear
Change in the value of C in the Equation (27)with respect to market share s1 if
demand function is convex so that ∂q(p12)
∂p12
> ∂q(p21)
∂p21
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Figure 7: Change in the value of C with respect to market share s1 if demand
function is convex
With reference to Figures (6) and (7), it would be inferred that for all s1 > 1/2
C gets positive if demand function is convex.
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